Azure Ad Introspection Endpoint
Microsoft Entra ID does not offer a standard azure ad introspection endpoint for token checks. Instead, teams check JSON Web Tokens locally using public keys from the identity provider. Most platform teams set up their apps to download these signing keys and check token signatures. When teams grant broad roles to those tokens, one valid token can run any command. How the azure ad introspection endpoint workflow operates in practice In standard OAuth setups, a resource server calls an introspe
Azure RBAC + Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): the complete guide
Architecture patterns, implementation strategies, and security best practices. Delivered to your inbox.
Microsoft Entra ID does not offer a standard azure ad introspection endpoint for token checks. Instead, teams check JSON Web Tokens locally using public keys from the identity provider. Most platform teams set up their apps to download these signing keys and check token signatures. When teams grant broad roles to those tokens, one valid token can run any command.
How the azure ad introspection endpoint workflow operates in practice
In standard OAuth setups, a resource server calls an introspection URL to check opaque tokens. The identity server replies and tells the app if the token is still active. Microsoft Entra ID, formerly Azure AD, takes a different path for token checks. It issues self-contained JSON Web Tokens that hold user claims, scopes, and expiration times.
Because these tokens carry their own data, Microsoft skips the standard introspection URL. Your app reads the discovery document from Microsoft to find the public signing keys. Then your app checks the cryptographic signature of the token on its own server. It also checks the issuer, the audience, and the expiration timestamp inside the token.
If a team needs to check if a user lost their account, local checks fall short. Issued tokens stay valid until they expire, which often takes an hour. To handle early revocations, Microsoft provides a continuous evaluation feature for supported apps. This feature pushes revocation events to the app so it can drop bad tokens early.
Why token validation alone leaves an operational gap
Local token validation and continuous evaluation solve the login problem very well. They prove who the user is and confirm that the identity provider issued the token. They also confirm which high-level role or group the user belongs to at login time. For basic web apps, this identity check is often enough to control page views.
Still, a major gap remains when engineers or services use tokens to reach backend systems. A token check only happens at the start of a session or request. It does not inspect the actual database queries, shell commands, or API calls in flight. Once the token passes validation, the user gets every permission tied to that role.
Azure RBAC + Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): architecture patterns and best practices
Continue reading? Get the full guide.
Free. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.
Teams often assign wide roles so engineers can fix production issues without delay. A valid token with write permissions lets an engineer run a safe read query. That exact same token also lets them drop a table or read sensitive customer data. Standard token validation cannot tell the difference between a safe command and a dangerous one.
What teams need beyond identity checks
To close this gap, teams need controls that look past the initial token check. Security rules must inspect every individual query or command before the target system runs it. If a query returns sensitive fields like emails, phone numbers, card numbers, or national IDs, masking should rewrite matched fields in results.
Teams also need to require peer reviews for risky actions without granting permanent admin roles. When you separate login checks from command checks, you reduce the blast radius of every token. You keep your identity provider as the source of truth while controlling what happens inside each session.
Check database and API queries on the wire
Identity tools, roles, and network rules decide who opens a session. Setup alone cannot check what each query does or mask sensitive values in a response once a session starts. When workflows touch Postgres, MySQL, SQL Server, MongoDB, ClickHouse, Kubernetes APIs, SSH, or internal HTTP APIs, hoop.dev sits inline in the wire protocol beside those services as an open-source proxy, a sidecar for your Postgres or API. On every query an AI agent or engineer runs against production, hoop.dev decides to pass, mask, block, or hold it for human review.
Your login details and client tools stay as they are while hoop.dev guardrails refuse bad deletes or drops before they run, and hoop.dev data masking rewrites matched sensitive values in responses in memory. Furthermore, hoop.dev holds SOC 2 Type II, is MIT licensed, and writes every query and decision to an audit trail that generates evidence for HIPAA, GDPR, and PCI DSS. See the source on GitHub.
Frequently asked questions
Does Microsoft Entra ID have a standard RFC 7662 introspection URL?
No, Microsoft Entra ID does not provide a public RFC 7662 introspection URL for standard tokens. Apps must validate JSON Web Tokens locally by checking the signature against Microsoft public keys.
How do you check if an Azure AD token was revoked before it expires?
Standard access tokens remain valid until their expiration timestamp passes. Teams can set up continuous access evaluation so Microsoft notifies the app when a user session ends.
Why is token validation not enough for database and server security?
Token validation only confirms user identity and broad role assignments at the start of a request. It cannot inspect individual SQL statements or shell commands, and it cannot mask sensitive data in results.
Related guides
In this post