Kerberos Separation of Duties: Architecture of Resilience

Kerberos separation of duties is the design choice that keeps privileged access from collapsing into a single point of failure. In secure networks, Kerberos issues tickets for authentication. Without separation of duties, one administrator could hold both the ability to manage the Key Distribution Center (KDC) and control the service accounts. That convergence is a risk. It means compromise once equals compromise everywhere.

Separating duties breaks that risk apart. One role manages the KDC—generating and maintaining the master keys, handling ticket-granting services. Another role manages the application or service accounts—mapping identities, configuring permissions, rotating service passwords. By enforcing this split, no single role can impersonate any user or service without detection.

Kerberos separation of duties also reduces insider threats. A malicious KDC admin cannot deploy their own service account and pivot across the domain. A service admin cannot alter ticket issuance. Together, but apart, they lock the system from both ends.

Implementation begins with hard role boundaries. Use administrative groups, audited workflows, and strict access controls at the KDC level. Apply role-based access control (RBAC) to service accounts. Require multi-person approval for changes in the realm configuration. Enable logging for all administrative actions and feed those logs into a SIEM for correlation.

Done right, Kerberos separation of duties strengthens the trust model. Each ticket issued by the KDC is part of a chain of responsibility that is transparent and verifiable. This design is not overhead—it is the architecture of resilience.

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