The alert hit at 2:13 a.m. An engineer’s account had accessed a production database, then a payroll system, all within minutes. No one had given that user permission for both. This was not random noise. This was a breakdown in separation of duties — and a classic sign of an insider threat.
Insider threat detection depends on knowing who can do what, and catching when those boundaries are crossed. Without strict separation of duties (SoD), you cannot tell normal work from malicious activity. When one account can deploy code, approve the change, and view sensitive payroll records, a single compromised credential becomes a single point of failure.
Separation of duties is simple in theory: no one person should have the power to execute every stage of a critical workflow. In practice, it demands well-defined permission models, continuous monitoring, and automated policy enforcement. Strong identity and access management (IAM) systems help, but they must be paired with logging, anomaly detection, and real-time alerts to be effective.