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Implementing Machine Identities for Cursor

An offboarded contractor’s CI job still holds a hard‑coded API key that talks directly to Cursor’s backend. The key was never rotated, and the job now runs on a shared runner that any developer can trigger. When the runner executes a query, the request bypasses any review, leaves no trace, and can exfiltrate sensitive code snippets. This is a classic machine identity problem: a credential that represents a non‑human actor, but that credential is treated like a static secret. Why machine identi

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An offboarded contractor’s CI job still holds a hard‑coded API key that talks directly to Cursor’s backend. The key was never rotated, and the job now runs on a shared runner that any developer can trigger. When the runner executes a query, the request bypasses any review, leaves no trace, and can exfiltrate sensitive code snippets. This is a classic machine identity problem: a credential that represents a non‑human actor, but that credential is treated like a static secret.

Why machine identity alone is insufficient

In most organizations the first line of defense is an identity provider. Engineers, service accounts, and CI pipelines receive OIDC or SAML tokens that prove who they are. That setup is essential – it decides who the request is and whether it may start. However, the identity check happens before the request reaches Cursor, and it does not inspect what the request actually does. The connection proceeds directly to the target service, carrying the credential unchanged. No audit log captures the exact query, no inline mask protects confidential fields, and no workflow can stop a dangerous command before it runs. The result is a blind spot where a compromised machine identity can cause data loss or lateral movement without any evidence.

What a secure data‑path gateway must provide

To close the gap, the enforcement point must sit on the data path itself. The gateway should be the only place where traffic to Cursor can be inspected, altered, or approved. It must be able to:

  • Record each session so that auditors can replay exactly what a machine did.
  • Mask or redact sensitive fields in responses, preventing secrets from leaking to logs.
  • Require just‑in‑time approval for high‑risk commands before they reach the backend.
  • Block commands that match a deny list, protecting the system from accidental or malicious misuse.

All of these capabilities rely on the gateway being the boundary between the identity provider and the Cursor service. Without that boundary, the machine identity remains a static credential with no real guardrails.

hoop.dev as the enforceable gateway

hoop.dev fulfills the data‑path requirement. It sits between the requestor – whether a CI job, an AI‑assisted tool, or a service account – and the Cursor backend. Because hoop.dev proxies the wire‑level protocol, it can inspect every query before it reaches the target.

When a request arrives, hoop.dev validates the OIDC token, extracts the machine identity, and then applies policy checks. If the query matches a rule that requires human approval, hoop.dev pauses the request and routes it to an approver. Once approved, the request is forwarded; if denied, hoop.dev blocks it entirely.

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During normal operation, hoop.dev records each session, capturing the full request and response stream. Those recordings are stored separately from the target service, giving audit teams a reliable record of activity. When a response contains fields marked as sensitive, hoop.dev masks them in real time, ensuring that logs and downstream consumers never see raw secrets.

Because the enforcement happens in the gateway, the underlying Cursor instance never sees the raw credential. The agent that runs inside the network only receives a short‑lived token from hoop.dev, so the original machine identity never touches the backend directly. This separation guarantees that the enforcement outcomes – session recording, inline masking, just‑in‑time approval, and command blocking – exist only because hoop.dev sits in the data path.

Getting started

To adopt this pattern, begin with the getting started guide. Deploy the hoop.dev gateway near your Cursor service, configure the OIDC provider that issues machine identities, and register Cursor as a proxied connection. The documentation walks through the required steps without exposing any credential in client code.

Further reading

For a deeper dive into policy configuration, masking options, and audit‑log retention, see the feature documentation. It explains how to define approval workflows, create deny lists, and integrate with existing CI pipelines.

FAQ

Does hoop.dev replace the identity provider?

No. The identity provider still issues the machine identity token. hoop.dev consumes that token and enforces policies on the data path.

Can existing Cursor clients connect without code changes?

Yes. Clients continue to use their standard Cursor client libraries. The only change is the endpoint – they point to the hoop.dev gateway instead of the direct service address.

Is the session data stored securely?

hoop.dev stores recordings in a location you configure, separate from the Cursor backend. This separation ensures that audit evidence cannot be altered by anyone with access to the target service.

Explore the source code and contribute on GitHub.

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