You can almost hear the sigh when a dev team realizes their Kubernetes workloads need secrets from two clouds. Amazon EKS is humming along in AWS, but your credentials live inside Google Cloud Secret Manager. The goal is simple: keep those secrets safe, synced, and automatic. The execution? Usually, a puzzle made of IAM, RBAC, and wishful thinking.
Amazon EKS gives you a managed Kubernetes control plane that plays nice with AWS IAM, spot instances, and everything north of the Lambda line. GCP Secret Manager handles encryption, rotation, and access control for sensitive keys without spreading them through YAML files like glitter. Combining the two lets you run workloads on EKS while securely fetching credentials stored in GCP, all under an identity model you actually trust.
At its core, this Amazon EKS GCP Secret Manager integration binds identities in AWS to permissions in GCP. Pods running in EKS assume AWS IAM roles via Kubernetes service account tokens. Those AWS roles, in turn, carry temporary credentials that can exchange identity through OIDC to authenticate against GCP’s APIs. No static JSON keys. No long-lived tokens. Just federated access stitched together by well-defined trust boundaries.
The basic flow looks like this:
A pod requests a secret. The workload identity provider issues a short-lived token signed by AWS. Google validates the token using the federated OIDC endpoint, then allows access only to the specific secret names authorized for that identity. The pod retrieves the value, caches it briefly, and moves on. Everything expires automatically.
If you hit permission errors, check that your trust relationship in GCP’s IAM policy maps the AWS role correctly, and ensure your Kubernetes service account annotations reference the role’s ARN. Also, rotate secrets on GCP’s side frequently. Short lifespans reduce replay risk and keep compliance officers calm.
Key benefits: