Custom Identity Provider MFA and Passkeys

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3 min read

Luis Felipe Dias

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You set up custom identity provider mfa and passkeys by linking your login service to WebAuthn rules. This setup requires users to prove who they are with a hardware key or device check. Most teams link their directory to a central login app first. Then they map group names to broad database or server roles. When those roles are too wide, one valid login still gives too much power. How custom identity provider mfa and passkeys work A custom identity provider handles user logins through open s

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You set up custom identity provider mfa and passkeys by linking your login service to WebAuthn rules. This setup requires users to prove who they are with a hardware key or device check. Most teams link their directory to a central login app first. Then they map group names to broad database or server roles. When those roles are too wide, one valid login still gives too much power.

How custom identity provider mfa and passkeys work

A custom identity provider handles user logins through open standards like OIDC or SAML. When a user tries to log in, the system asks for a second factor. Passkeys replace weak text codes with cryptographic keys stored on a phone or hardware token. The user unlocks the key with a fingerprint, face scan, or local PIN.

During sign-in, the login server sends a fresh challenge to the user device. The device signs that challenge with its private key and sends it back. The login server checks the signature against the public key on file. If the check passes, the server issues a signed token with user group claims.

Downstream databases, cloud consoles, and servers read those claims to assign a local role. This flow stops phishing because the passkey binds to the exact domain name. Attackers cannot trick a user into typing a passkey into a fake login page. Your team gets a fast login flow without shared passwords or SMS codes.

Why login checks alone leave a runtime gap

Strong login checks prove who sits at the keyboard at the start of a session. They also sync user groups from your central directory to target systems. When someone leaves the company, you disable one account to stop new logins everywhere. This setup solves the problem of stolen passwords and fake login sites.

Still, the identity provider steps out of the way once the session starts. It decides who logs in, not what commands or queries run next. A developer who passes a passkey check often lands in a shared admin role. That role might allow dropping tables, reading all rows, or changing server state by default.

Passkeys + Identity Provider Integration: architecture patterns and best practices

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If an engineer runs a wide query, the database returns every column in full. The login server cannot rewrite emails, phone numbers, card numbers, or national IDs in flight. It also cannot pause a risky delete command to ask a peer for approval. Teams need controls that inspect each action after the login check finishes.

Planning role boundaries after the login check

To reduce risk, teams split broad directory groups into smaller task roles. You can map one group to read-only queries and another to schema changes. Keep default sessions restricted so daily work does not carry full admin rights. High-impact commands should require a separate check at the moment they run.

You should also track what happens inside each session at the command level. Login logs only show that a user signed in at nine in the morning. They do not show which tables that user read five minutes later. Pairing strong sign-in rules with command-level checks closes this operational gap.

Add runtime guardrails and masking beside your databases and APIs

Login rules, role grants, and CI checks govern who connects to your stack. Yet any allowed script, engineer, or AI agent still runs commands with the full scope of its role. For workloads on Postgres, MySQL, SQL Server, MongoDB, ClickHouse, Kubernetes, SSH, or internal HTTP services, hoop.dev sits inline in the protocol beside the service as an open-source proxy, a sidecar for your database or API. On every production query an agent or human runs, hoop.dev decides whether to pass, mask, block, or escalate it for review.

Before a query runs, hoop.dev guardrails check the statement against your rules, an AI Analyzer you configure can score intent or hold risky calls for human approval, and hoop.dev data masking rewrites sensitive fields in responses in memory. Explore the MIT-licensed project on GitHub.

Frequently asked questions

Can we use both passkeys and authenticator apps in one custom provider?

Yes, most OIDC and SAML providers let you enable multiple factor types at once. You can require passkeys for admin groups while allowing app codes for basic users.

Do passkeys stop someone from running a bad SQL query?

No, passkeys only verify the user identity at the start of the login flow. Once the database session opens, native role permissions decide which queries can run.

What happens if a developer loses a device with their passkey?

An admin can revoke that public key in the identity provider right away. The user then registers a backup key or uses a synced passkey to log in.

Save the open-source gateway.

hoop is MIT-licensed infrastructure for controlling how AI agents reach production data. Star hoophq/hoop so you can inspect it, deploy it, or share it when your team starts governing agent access.