Kerberos fails loud when something is broken, but it whispers when something is off. That’s what makes auditing Kerberos both critical and tricky. You need to see what others miss. Bad configurations hide in plain sight. Weak encryption hides in “temporary” exceptions. Attackers hide in replayed tickets that seem valid but aren’t.
Auditing Kerberos starts with visibility. Know the flow—authentication, ticket-granting, service tickets. Track which keys were used, when tickets were issued, and where they were requested. Every unusual pattern is a lead. A sudden spike in service ticket requests from one endpoint? That’s a trail to follow. A mismatch between the allowed encryption types and what’s actually in play? That’s a gap to close.
Logs are your primary weapon. Centralize them, correlate them, and don’t throw away detail. Ticket-granting ticket (TGT) lifetimes, pre-authentication failures, and unusual delegation should always raise questions. Pull event IDs for Kerberos authentication from your domain controllers. Filter for failures, sort by frequency, then review every outlier. Many breaches expose themselves here first.
Encryption settings matter. Auditing Kerberos without checking for RC4 remnants is like changing the locks but leaving a window open. Force AES. Drop des-cbc-md5. If older services depend on it, upgrade them or remove them. Any exception you leave behind is an entry point you own.