A single misconfigured scope can hand an attacker the keys to your kingdom. Least privilege in OpenID Connect (OIDC) is not a nice-to-have. It is the thin line between a controlled trust boundary and total exposure.
OIDC builds on OAuth 2.0 to federate authentication and authorization. By default, it can request broad claims, profile data, and permissions. Without least privilege, client applications often request more scopes than they need. That excess access expands the attack surface, increases blast radius, and violates security principle of minimal necessary access.
A least privilege OIDC implementation starts by defining the smallest set of scopes and claims required for each application. If a service only needs email, do not grant profile or openid claims beyond that need. When integrating with identity providers, configure authorization policies to restrict tokens to precise actions. Short-lived access tokens further limit exposure. Refresh tokens should be disabled or scoped tightly for high-risk operations.
Auditing is critical. Review OIDC client registrations. Remove unused scopes. Monitor token issuance logs and enforce scope validation at the resource server. Use well-defined roles and separate them from user identity attributes. Map every privilege to a business requirement, not a convenience for developers.