Kubectl Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes
The command runs. Access changes hands. Security unravels in seconds.
Kubectl privilege escalation is not theory. It is a direct path from limited Kubernetes access to full cluster control. Once an attacker moves beyond their assigned role, they can create pods that run as cluster-admin, mount sensitive service account tokens, or execute commands on the control plane itself.
Understanding this risk starts with Kubernetes’ RBAC model. Permissions in Kubernetes are tied to service accounts, roles, and role bindings. Misconfigurations often grant more than intended. A developer account with permissions to create pods or edit role bindings can chain these actions into root access over the entire cluster.
The most common kubectl privilege escalation vectors include:
- Creating a privileged pod that mounts the host filesystem
- Patching or creating roles with elevated permissions
- Impersonating higher-privilege accounts using
kubectl auth can-iinsights - Leveraging kubeconfig files left exposed in containers or persistent volumes
Mitigation requires more than trusting developers to avoid mistakes. Enforce least privilege in RBAC. Restrict who can create pods and role bindings. Audit cluster activity and kubeconfigs. Disable Kubernetes dashboard if not locked down with strict authentication. Deploy admission controllers that block dangerous configurations before they reach the API server.
Detection is equally important. Monitor for unexpected role changes, new privilege-granting cluster roles, or pods running with host mounts and privileged flags. Tools that log and alert on these actions can stop escalation before damage spreads.
Privilege escalation in Kubernetes through kubectl is a critical, well-documented threat that thrives in overly permissive configurations. Closing these gaps requires clear policies, automated enforcement, and real-time visibility.
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